SEMINARS
Search by Date

EXTERNAL

07NOVEMBER2022
Mohan Venkatachalam (Duke University)
TBA
10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
11OCTOBER2022
Jay Swaminathan (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)
TBA
10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
26SEPTEMBER2022
Gaizka Ormazabal (IESE)
Trading of Emission Allowances and Financial Frictions
10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
27JUNE2022
Stephan Billinger (University of Southern Denmark)
Learning to search collaboratively: How dyads overcome complexity and misaligned incentives in imper
10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
 
21JUNE2022
Shannon Anderson (University of California - Davis)
International Evidence on Cost Management: Firm Adjustments to Market Changes
10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
 
20JUNE2022
Cristina Grande (Bayes Business School)
Race to Board Independence: Evidence on strategic compliance with corporate governance regulation
10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
 
15JUNE2022
Laura Gail Lunsford (Campbell University)
On Destructive Leadership
10.2.10
Time : 13:00h.
 
13JUNE2022
Jing Zhou (Rice University)
Effects of power on creative idea endorsement
10.2.08
Time : 13:00h.
 
09JUNE2022
Ioanid Rosu (HEC Paris)
Dynamic Adverse Selection and Liquidity
10.2.11
Time : 13:00h.
 
02JUNE2022
Jian Zhou (University of Hawaii at Manoa)
Creditor Governance and Mandatory Information Disclosure Quality
10.2.11
Time : 13:00h.
 
31MAY2022
Effie Kesidou (University of Leeds)
Penalty Zones in International Sustainability Standards: Where Improved Sustainability Doesn’t Pay
10.2.12
Time : 13:00h.

ABSTRACT 

International Sustainability Standards (ISSs) help firms improve their sustainability performance and act as credible market “signals” that legitimize companies’ latent sustainability practices. Prior studies show a positive association between firms’ ISS signaling and their improved market value and sustainability performance. Our research suggests that signals behave differently when firms adopt multiple ISSs in that, beyond an optimum, ISS signals provide information, which investors devalue, causing firms’ market value to decline. Further, while we suggest that sustainability performance derived from adopting multiple ISSs also declines beyond an optimum, the number of ISSs that optimizes firms’ market value is less than the number that optimizes sustainability performance. We call this difference a performance “penalty zone,” where firms continue to improve their sustainability performance but at a market penalty. These findings offer important nuance to signaling theory and assumptions that improved sustainability pays.  

Keywords: International sustainability standards; market value; penalty zone; signaling theory; sustainability performance  

30MAY2022
Deepak Somaya (University of Illinois)
Why Unicorns Exist: Venture Scalability and the Valuation and Timing of Startup IPOs
10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.