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22FEBRARY2016
Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?
Campus Getafe. Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
15FEBRARY2016
Reeyarn Zhiyang Li (School of Business HKUST)
Democratic Judges, Litigation Risk, and Voluntary Disclosure via 8-K Filings
Campus Getafe. Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
11FEBRARY2016
Saipriya Kamath (Indian School of Business)
Once Bitten Once Shy: Learning or Risk-Aversion after Large Audit Failures?
Campus Getafe. Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
10FEBRARY2016
Andrea Bafundi (IE BUSINESS SCHOOL)
Being Monitored or Not Being Monitored: Evidence from Managerial Ability and Risk Disclosure
Campus Getafe. Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
 
08FEBRARY2016
Paulo Maduro (Univerisdad de Nueva York)
Mutual Fund Trading Pressure, Stock Mispricing, and Management Earnings Forecasts
Campus Getafe. Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
 
04FEBRARY2016
The informational content of prices when policy makers react to financial markets
Campus Getafe. Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
 
03FEBRARY2016
Pratik Goel (Indian School of Business)
CEO - tenure and tone management
Campus Getafe. Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
01FEBRARY2016
Igor Kadach (New York University Stern)
Mutual Fund Trading Pressure, Stock Mispricing, and Management Earnings Forecasts
Campus Getafe. Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
 
28JANUARY2016
Sergio Correia (Duke University)
Credit Supply Shocks, Consumer Borrowing and Bank Competitive Response: Evidence from Credit Card Ma
Campus de Getafe. Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
27JANUARY2016
Claudia Imperatore (IE)
Financial Reporting Quality and Corporate Financing: Evidence from The Financial Crisis
Campus de Getafe 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
 
25JANUARY2016
Are Family and Friends the Wrong Investors? Evidence from U. S. Startups
Campus de Getafe. Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
01DECEMBER2015
Simas Kucinskas
Liquidity Creation Without Banks
Campus Getafe. Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
I revisit the Diamond-Dybvig model of liquidity insurance in the presence of hidden trades. The key result is that in this environment deposit-taking banks are not necessary for the efficient provision of liquidity. Mutual funds are constrained efficient when supplemented with the same government liquidity regulation that is required to make a banking system constrained efficient. However, whereas banks are potentially subject to costly panics, mutual funds are not run-prone and hence superior from a welfare perspective if runs happen with a non-zero probability. Universidad VU de Amsterdam y Tinbergen Institute