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27SEPTEMBER2021
Iris Steenkamp (London Business School)
"Can Selling Change The Salesperson? Experimental Evidence on Resilience Amidst The Covid-19 Pandemi
Online / Contact business.seminars@uc3m.es
Time : 13:00h.
 
24SEPTEMBER2021
Rahil Hosseini (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)
"The Scale Effect: How Rating Scales Affect Product Evaluation"
Online / Contact business.seminars@uc3m.es
Time : 13:00h.
 
22SEPTEMBER2021
Ziwei Cong (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)
"The Role of “Live” in Livestreaming Markets: EvidenceUsing Orthogonal Random Forest"
Online / Contact business.seminars@uc3m.es
Time : 15:00h.
 
13SEPTEMBER2021
Ross Levine (Berkeley Haas)
Selection into Entrepreneurship and Self-Employment
Online / Contact business.seminars@uc3m.es
Time : 16:00h.
 
14JUNE2021
Olivier Chatain (HEC París)
The Ecosystem Penalty: Value Creation Technologies and Incentive Misalignment
Online / Contact business.seminars@uc3m.es
Time : 13:00h.
07JUNE2021
Juanita González-Uribe (LBS)
Leverage Limits in Good and Bad Times
Online / Contact business.seminars@uc3m.es
Time : 13:00h.
 
31MAY2021
Wayne Landsman (Kenan-Flagler Business School)
Do Changes in Financial Reporting Standards Alter Capital Allocations? An Industry-Focused Analysis
Online / Contact business.seminars@uc3m.es
Time : 16:00h.
 
17MAY2021
Lasse Pedersen (Copenhagen Business School)
Game On: Social Networks and Markets
Online / Contact business.seminars@uc3m.es
Time : 13:00h.
Paper 
10MAY2021
John Kuong (INSEAD)
The Design of a Central Counterparty
Online / Contact business.seminars@uc3m.es
Time : 13:00h.
Abstract: This paper studies the benefits of central clearing and the design of a central counterparty (CCP) with an optimal contracting approach. Investors sign contracts to hedge an underlying exposure. There is counterparty risk because investors can default on the contract due to idiosyncratic shocks and moral hazard. Mutualization of losses can thus hedge against counterparty risk but demands collateral for preventing moral hazard. The optimal contract involves loss mutualization, which requires central clearing, only when the cost of collateral is intermediate. Furthermore, as loss mutualization dilutes investors' incentives to monitor their counterparties, a third-party CCP can emerge as a centralized monitor and is given a first-loss, equity tranche as incentive compensation. Our results endogenize key features of the default resolution process, known as ``default waterfall", in a CCP. Finally, we show that larger user base of a contract favours central clearing (over bilateral trading) and clearing with third-party CCP (over member-owned CCP).
 
28APRIL2021
Joshua H Katz (University of Illinois)
Metaphors that Exclude: Sports Metaphors Exclude Women and Diminish the Performance of Mixed-Sex Tea
Online / Contact business.seminars@uc3m.es
Time : 15:00h.
 
26APRIL2021
Gino Cattani (Leonard N. Stern School of Business)
Tradition as a Resource: Robust and Radical Interpretations of Operatic Tradition in the Italian Op
Online / Contact business.seminars@uc3m.es
Time : 15:00h.
 
22APRIL2021
Hubertus Wolff (University of Cologne)
The Measurement of Corporate Tax Avoidance in the Presence of Net Operating Losses
Online / Contact business.seminars@uc3m.es
Time : 13:00h.