Un reciente artículo publicado en Forbes menciona el trabajo del prof. Nikolaos Kavadis y su coautor, el prof. Xavier Castañer, sobre las consecuencias negativas que tiene, en términos de diversificación de la compañía, de designar esquemas de retribución de directivos basados en la compensación por acciones cuando se abordan problemas de agencia. El trabajo de Kavadis y Castañer fue publicado en la revista Strategic Management Journal.
[Extraído de Forbes Magazine] “In short, Castañer and Kavadis believe that agency theory actually encourages the diversification of companies into different fields that has often proved so ruinous for shareholder value. Based on an extensive study of French companies, many with international operations, they conclude that, in Castaner’s words, “neither the granting of stock options to the CEO, nor the CEO’s ownership of shares had a significant constraining effect on financial diversification.” Rather, the variable compensation associated with moving executives from strict salaries “actually leads to more financial diversification.” This is because the executive sees this unpredictability of compensation as risk – to which agency theory assumes executives are averse – and compensates by trying to make revenues less volatile and so increase the chances of hitting performance targets. At the same time, executives enhance their situation by creating organizations that are bigger and more complex and so require them to be paid more to run them”
Lea el artículo de Forbes aquí: http://www.forbes.com/sites/
Lea el trabajo de investigación original aquí: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.
