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Sergi Basco (Uc3m)
Contagion and Bubbles: Evidence from the South Sea Bubble
Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
Josef Schroth (Bank of Canada)
Supervising Financial Regulators
Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
Lee-Seok Hwang (Seoul National University)
Competition Type, Competition Intensity, and Financial Policies
Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
Elvira Scarlat (Uc3m)
CEO and CFO Gender and Firm-Wide Insider Trading
Getafe, Aula 10.0.27
Time : 14:00h.
Diana Constanza Restrepo (Uc3m)
Three Essays on Expropriation Risk and its Effect on Private Investment
Campus de Getafe, aula 10.0.27
Time : 10:00h.
David Barberá Charlene Ziestma (Uc3m)
Power, discourse and strategy in non-confrontational organizations
Campus Getafe. Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
Patrick Gaule (CERGE-EI )
Air fare costs and and academic collaborations by Patrick Gaule
Campus de Getafe, Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
Appointments of demographic minorities in managerial positions
Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
Mahmoud Aymo
Lectura y defensa de Tesis de Mahmoud Aymo: Three Essays on Institutional Investing
12:00h, Aula 11.1.16
Time : 12:00h.
Director: Dr. D. José Javier Gil Bazo, Profesor Titular de la Universidad Pompeu Fabra Presidente: Dr. D. Miguel Ángel Tapia Torres, Catedrático de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (España) Vocal: Dra. Dña. María Natividad Blasco de las Heras, Catedrática de la Universidad de Zaragoza (España) Secretario: Dr. D. Miguel Ángel Martínez Sedano, Profesor Titular de la Universidad del País Vasco(España). Suplente: Dr. D. Silviu Ionut Glavan, Profesor Investigador de la IE University. 
Regional crime rates and reporting quality: Evidence from private firms in London.
Campus Getafe. Aula 10.0.27
Time : 13:00h.
Prior literature suggests that social norms or social capital influences corporate managers’ propensity to seek private rents, thereby being associated with financial reporting quality. Analyzing private firms headquartered in London, we examine whether borough-level crime rates are associated with financial reporting quality of the residing firms. Our findings suggest that firms in a borough with higher crime rates are more likely to get involved in earnings management. We also find that firms in such boroughs tend to exhibit higher levels of tax avoidance. Our results imply that crime rates, an extreme form of social capital breakdown, influence the incentives to provide credible accounting information.